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Cloning: Legal, Medical,
Ethical and Social Issues
Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Health and Environment
of the Committee on Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
February 12, 1998

The Written Testimony of
Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D.
Dr. Irving is a lecturer in philosophy at The Catholic University of
America, Washington, D.C In the text that follows, she has added
emphasis to aid those lay readers unfamiliar with technical
terminology.
In addition to the following, Dr. Irving initially
presented a verbal summary to the Committee Members.

Chairman Bilirakis and Members of the Sub-Committee on Health and
Environment, I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on the
profound and critically important issue of human cloning, and am grateful
that you are so diligently addressing and pursuing the information
necessary upon which to ground a clear and defensible public policy in this
area.'
I would like to emphasize that what I have to say today is not
simply a matter of my own opinion; nor is it a religious or theological
position, nor grounded on any " faith " or " belief' system. To the contrary,
it is directly based on fully referenced, objectively known sc ientific facts scientific facts which anyone can ascertain simply by going to their local
library.
The bottom-line question concerning human cloning - not just by
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means of nuclear transfer, but by any other technique of cloning as well is, "What is the immediate product of human cloning?" If the product of
human cloning is a tomato, a head of lettuce, a frog or a giraffe, then our
concerns about using that product for destructive experimental research or
for commercial purposes would be quite different than if the product of
human cloning is a human being. And simply because we can do
something technically does not make it ethical to actually do it. Utilitarian
ethics would argue that great advances could be made to cure diseases, to
increase our scientific knowledge or to reap great fortunes in the
commercial marketplace. But even goals agreed to be truly beneficent and
genuinely good are simply not sufficient in the determination of what is
ethical research. The means used to reach those beneficent goals must be
ethical as well. If the means used involve the harm and destruction of
human beings, or the denigration of their inherent human dignity, then such
research and commercialization would be unethical.
A point of clarity first. The question as to when a human embryo,
or human being, begins, is strictly a scientific question, and should not be
relegated to bioethicists, philosophers, theologians, governmental agencies
or politicians.
The answer to this question is simple. There is
unquestionably a scientific consensus that the life of every single individual
human being begins at fertilization as a single-cell human embryo (the
zygote). I have included in my written testimony scores of scientific
footnotes and references, from many different, highly acclaimed and the
most commonly used human embryology text books, and have included the
xeroxed pages from a number of these text books with my written
testimony to demon strate this scientific fact. What is true of the product of
fertilization is true of the product of human cloning.
The question as to when a human person begins is a
philosophical question . I have included for the record several of my
articles discussing this at length, demon strating that " personhood" must
begin when the human being begins - at fertilization (or, cloning). I will
only refer briefly to the personhood (or philosophical) issue at the end of
my testimony.
Many people (including members of Congress) have been
thoroughly confused by the bioethics literature that the product of
fertilization - or in this case, the product of human cloning - is not a
human embryo, a human being, or a human person .2 Elaborate scientific
arguments have been flooding the bioethics literature for some years now,
positing such unscientific claims as the foll owing.
It is argued that fertilizati on (or, likewise, cloning) is not the
beginning of a human embryo or of a human being; it is just a " blob" or
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piece of the mother's tissues. At most what is there is only a "potential" or
a " possible" human being. Fr. Bedate and Dr. Cefalo agree, claiming that
all of the genetic information specific for a human being is not present at
fertilization, and that human embryos can give rise to teratomas or
hydatidiform moles, and therefore are not even "human" at alI.)
Many have argued that fertilization (or cloning) may be the
beginning of a human being but not the beginning of a human person (a
philosophical or theological claim grounded on incorrect science). They
have literalIy invented a new term called the "pre-embryo" to designate
the product of fertilization (and now, cloning) from fertilization to
implantation (5-6 days) or the formation of the primitive streak (14 days).
What is present during this early period is only a "potential" or a " possible"
human person or individual - and "individuality" is required, they say,
before there can be personhood. For example, Dr. Clifford Grobstein (who
is an amphibian embryologist, and not a human embryologist) and Fr.
Richard McCormick, SJ . (a theologian) make the "scientific" claim that a
geneticalIy human being is present at fertilization, but it is not a human
individual as yet (because it could still become more than one individual),
and therefore not a human person as yet - it is just a " pre-embryo". To
support this scientific myth they make the folIowing "scientific" claims.
To begin its growth, the human pre-embryo divides exponentially (i.e.,
1,2,4, 16,32,etc.). All of the outer trophoblast cells from the 5-6 day
blastocyst are discarded after birth ; only the cells from the inner
embryoblast layer become the future adult. Therefore, the 5-6 day
blastocyst is really a "pre-embryo", not an embryo (which doesn ' t begin,
they say, until about 14 days, or the formation of the primitive streak others argue similarly for about three weeks after fertilization) . Further,
these early totipotent cells are only a " loose collection of cells", and "have
not decided yet how many individuals they will be". And most influential,
they claim that twinning cannot take place after 14 days, so 14 days must
be the beginning of a human individual, and therefore, of a human person.
The early human " pre-embryo", then, is not a true human embryo or a
4
human " individual", and therefore not a true human person yet.
This is precisely the " science", by the way, which the N.I.H.
Human Embryo Research Panel referenced in their Report to ground their
conclusion that the " pre-embryo" or " pre-implantation embryo" (a
legitimate term they use to mean the same as the "pre-embryo"), has a
" reduced" moral status - and therefore it can be used in destructive
experimental research . (It is interesting that there was not even one single
human embryologist present on that N.I.H . PaneI 5 ). This is also precisely
the "science" currently being used in the cloning debates in Congress to
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argue that the product of cloning is only a potential human embryo or
human being, and therefore can be used in destructive experimentation to
find cures for human diseases, etc.
The Australian theologian, Fr. Norman Ford, who wrote the book
When Did I Begin?, so influential in bioethics and currently used as a
scientific resource in the American pharmaceutical industry, agrees with
the scientific claims of Fr. McCormick and Dr. Grobstein, adding to their
"science" his own claim that full differentiation is not even completed until
14 days.6 Finally, some, e.g. , MacKay, Rahner, Ruff, Haring, Hans-Martin,
Sass, Singer and Wells - most of whom are philosophers or theologians argue that true "personhood" is not present until "brain-birth", i.e., the
formation of the primitive streak, the nerve-net, the neocortex or the whole
brain integrating system. 7
On the contrary, a human embryo or a human being begins at
fertilization (or cloning). This human being, who is a single-cell human
embryo or zygote, is not a " potential" or " possible" human being, but is an
already existing human embryo, which is an already existing human
being - with the "potential" or " possibility" to simply grow and develop
bigger and bigger. Scientifically, there is no change in what it is, or its
nature, once the single-cell human embryo or human being is formed. One
can easily verity that scientifically as well (and therefore all arguments for
delayed personhood are scientifically negated).
The correct scientific facts about which there is a scientific
consensus are the following. Human life is biologically a continuum which
has not halted or been interrupted for thousands of years. Although this
continuum may be seen by some to be just a " process", it must be pointed
out that there must be something there which is undergoing the " process".
For example, "childhood" is a " process", yet no one would seriously argue
that there is no child present which is undergoing that process. Similarly,
fertilization (or cloning) is a process; but there is something which is
undergoing that process. A human sperm or ovum, a kidney cell, or a liver,
may be said to have human " life", but the real issue is that they are not
human beings, capable themselves of directing and sustaining the
continuum of human life. One could implant any of these in a uterus and
they would simply rot. Only human beings can direct and sustain the
continuum of human life and tran smit it. Once a skin cell has been used in
cloning, a change in natures has taken place. That is, it is no longer a skin
cell ; it has been changed into a human being. It no longer acts or functions
as a skin cell; it now acts and function s as a human being (we know this
scientifically). This is precisely the difference between a skin cell and the
product of human cloning.
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To scientifically determine if the immediate product of fertilization
or cloning is a human embryo or a human being, all one has to do is count
the number of chromosomes under a microscope, and particularly observe
the functions and activities which are present immediately at fertilization or
cloning (since scientists know that a thing acts or functions according to
what it is). Fertilization or cloning does not produce a " blob" or piece of
tissue of the mother, or a "drug".
In fertilization , when the 23
chromosomes of the sperm and the 23 chromosomes of the ovum are
combined, a new, genetically unique, living, individual, already existing
single-cell human embryo or human being (the single-cell human zygote)
with 46 chromosomes (the number and quality specific for the human
species)8 is formed, and this human being has the capacity itself to direct
all of its further growth and development. Although this means that the
human embryo is an already existing human being, the chromosomal
makeup of the single-cell human embryo is qualitatively different from that
of either the mother or the father. That is, the genetic identity of the human
embryo is different from the genetic identity of the tissues of the mother.
The same would be true of the product of cloning, as the genetic makeup of
the new human embryo, although an already existing human being, would
be qualitatively different from the genetic makeup of the donor "mother"
(due, e.g., to crossing-over of the maternal chromosomes during mitosis
and cell division, environmental conditions, mutations, etc.).
In
fertilization, the single-cell human embryo formed at fertilization is already
genetically a male or a female; in cloning, it would already be genetically a
female. 9
In beginning its growth, the human embryo divides
asynchronously (i.e., 1,2,3,etc.).lo
Immediately specifically human enzymes and proteins are formed
(not tomato, lettuce or giraffe proteins and enzymes). Specifically human
tissues and organs are formed (tomato, lettuce, or giraffe ti ssues or organs
are not formed - that is a scientific fact) . 11 Virtually all of the genetic
information this human being will ever have or need is present immediately
at fertilization or cloning. No new genetic information is gained or lost
throughout development - only the use of some information is lost through
mechanisms such as methylation. 12 This original genetic information
"cascades" throughout the course of human development, determining later
molecular information, tissue and organ formation ; 13 and it includes the
genetic information needed for differentiation,14 totipotency (in which the
cells are already expressing differentiation)1 5 and all of the processes of
human embryogenesis - sometimes even twinning. Entities such as
teratomas and hydatidiform moles do not arise from genetically normal
human embryos, but from abnormal embryos to begin with (e.g.,
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dispermy).16
Further, the " pre-embryo" is a sCientific myth. Scientifically we
know that all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are not all discarded
after birth, but many from the yolk sac and allantois are incorporated into
the embryo-proper as the early blood cells and the primordium of the
primitive gut, and in the human adult as the median umbilical ligament and
blood cells. I? Twinning is possible after /4 days and the formation of the
primitivf streak - indeed, months after fertilization - e.g., with fetus-inls
fetu twins and with Siamese or conjoined twins.
The term " pre-embryo" has a very interesting history, but has now
been rejected by all human embryologists, including the internationally
renowned human embryologist Ronan O ' Rahilly, who himself literally
developed the internationally recognized Carnegie Stages of human
embryological development. O ' Rahilly has published that the term "preembryo" is "scientifically inaccurate" and erroneous, and states in his own
human embryology textbook that he refuses to use the term. 19 The N .I.H.
Panel - whose conclusions, and the grounding for those conclusions,
received unusually harsh responses and reviews even within bioethics itself
- gave up using the term (but retained the use of the term "preimplantation" embryo to mean the same as the term " pre-embryo" )?O
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(A.C.O.G .), who along with several others have marketed the term "preembryo" for many years, has recently and reluctantly decided to go back to
the scientifically accurate term "embryo" for the immediate product of
fertilization (or cloning). A.C.O.G. also reluctantly agreed to drop its drive
to define the " beginning of pregnancy" as implantation, after quite a
scientific outcry from within its own membership as well as from
colleagues outside of the organization . " Pregnancy" is correctly defined
scientifically as beginning at fertilization. 21 Unfortunately, N.I.H .' s federal
OPRR regulations 22 and Common Rule, which regulate the use of human
subjects in research, still (in several revisions since 1981) contain the
scientifically incorrect definitions of " pregnancy" as beginning at
implantation (5-6 days after fertilization) , and of " fetus" as also beginning
at implantation (the fetal period actually does not begin until the ninth
week after fertilization 23 ). Keith Moore, also not a human embryologist,
but often quoted by McCormick, Grobstein and others, has agreed in
writing that the term " pre-embryo", which he had just used for the first time
in the 5th edition of his human development text book, was scientifically
incorrect, and that he would have it removed in the next printings?4 Even
Clifford Grobstein admitted to a scientific audience that he was using frog
embryology and just calling it human embryology. 25
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And finally , there is no scientific physiological basis for a valid
parallel between " brain death" and " brain birth", "sentience", or selfconsicousness. 26 Full human development, especially brain and nervous
system development, and full brain integration,27 and the actual exercising
of what bioethicists call " rational attributes" and "sentience" are not
complete until young adulthood. 28
In sum, the answer to the first question , the scientific question, is
simple and clear: the life of every human embryo and human being begins
immediately at fertilization , or at cloning. Indeed, human cloning is
essentially human embryo research. Thus cloning would be one ingenious
way in which to by-pass or circumvent the current Congressional ban on
human embryo research. The human embryo at fertilization or cloning is
immediately an already existing, new, unique, individual human being termed by scientists the single-cell human zygote. This is a scientific Jact.
And this is the way human beings are supposed to look at this stage of
development. This is not a religious, theological or philosophical issue, nor
a matter of anyone's belief system or opinion . Anyone - scientist or
otherwise - who claims that this is not true or accurate, is scientifically
wrong, and should be required to give extensive scientific proofs based
only on the work of nationally and internationally recognized human
embryologists - especially if such critically important public policy is to be
explicitly based on it.
It would seem to me that public policy should only be based on the
correct scientific Jacts. I would conclude, therefore, on scientific grounds
alone, that the cloning or commercialization of any human beings should be
banned - both publicly and privately - since human cloning and its
commercialization necessarily and immediately produces human bejngs
(which remain human beings whether implanted or not), and is essentially
human embryo research. Human cloning and commercialization must by
definition be unethical since the means used result in harm to and
destruction of untold numbers of innocent human beings - human beings
used solely as objects for someone else's goals - no matter how lofty those
goals may be. Technology would then surely be master of man, rather than
man master of technology.
The last question is, " when does a human person begin?,,29 As
with public policy, any philosophical analysis of personhood must begin
with and be based on the correct scientific facts. This is required for
philosophical realism. Further, a thing acts or functions according to the
kind of nature it has - or what it is. If a " human being" is a " rational
animal"; if the term " rational" must include virtually the vegetative and
sensitive powers; if all of its powers must be present simultaneously with
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the body, with no splits - then personhood must begin when the human
being begins - at fertilization, or cloning - when the "matter" is already
"appropriately organized". This actually matches the correct science:
immediately at fertilization or cloning, specifically human enzymes and
proteins are produced, and specifically human tissues and organs are
continuously developed from fertilization or cloning on. Personhood, then,
should be based on what something is, not on how one actually thinks or
feels (merely functional definitions of a human person).
Yet other philosophical answers have been offered - based
essentially on functionalism and on bioethics ' rendition of philosophical
rationalism or empiricism. 3o The question must be, do those arguments for
"delayed" personhood square with or match the correct scientific facts; are
they based on historically correct philosophical claims, or even
philosophical claims which are theoretically or practically defensible, or
logically valid and sound? Where does this bioethics logic take us? I
and many others have demonstrated that these arguments have consistently
and extensively used incorrect science, do not match the correct scientific
facts, and are often historically inaccurate and philosophically indefensible
(e.g., contain a mind/body split). In fact, none of the conclusions of these
arguments even follow logically from their major and minor premises. It
would seem that philosophical, theological or purely political
presuppositions have been imposed on the scientific data. And if the true
scientific data does not match, then it is simply changed accordingly.
Of equal concern is where we would end up as a society if that
bioethics logic is pushed . If either "sentience" (the ability to feel pain and
pleasure) or " rational attributes" (willing, choosing, loving, selfconsciousness, the ability to relate to the world around us, etc.) are the
rationale for human "personhood", then newborns, young children,
Alzheimers and Parkinson patients, alcoholics, drug addicts, street people,
runaways, the mentally ill and retarded, the depressed, the frail elderly,
comatose patients, paraplegics and other patients with paralysis, patients in
a persistent vegetative state - perhaps even teen-agers or politicians - (to
name but a few) are not ··persons " either, and thus, by the same logic,
could be "disposed of' or experimented on at will. Indeed, the Australian
philosopher Peter Singer (whose book, oddly enough, was the only
reference used to ground the N.I.H . Human Embryo Research Panel ' s
scientific charts) has used such arguments to justifY the infanticide of
normal healthy infants (because they do not exercise high levels of
" rational attributes" or "sentience" - yet the higher primates, e.g., pigs,
dogs, gorillas, etc., do, says Singer, and therefore he claims these animals
are " persons,,).31 Philosopher Richard Frey,32 correctly following Singer' s
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logic, has published that many adult human beings on the above list are not
persons because they do not actively exercise "rational attributes" or
"sentience"; therefore they should be substituted for the higher primates,
e.g., pigs, dogs, gorillas, etc. - who are persons - in destructive
experimental research. Norman Fost has argued that anencephalic
newborns are "brain dead", and therefore we could take their organs for
He has also argued that the
transplantation while they are alive.
"cognitively impaired" are "brain dead" (and one wonders if that means
that their organs can be taken while alive as well). And so the logic goes.
Not only scientists, but also philosophers, theologians and
bioethicists must be held to the same degree of accountability for their
"expertise", especially when their "theories" on personhood would in any
way be used to ground public policy. My guess is that they could never
withstand such Congressional scrutiny. Thank you.
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